What Jury? A New Approach to Obviousness after KSR v. Teleflex by Suthar, Rishi S.
Journal of Intellectual Property Law
Volume 18 | Issue 1 Article 10
October 2010
What Jury? A New Approach to Obviousness after
KSR v. Teleflex
Rishi S. Suthar
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Intellectual
Property Law by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more
information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rishi S. Suthar, What Jury? A New Approach to Obviousness after KSR v. Teleflex, 18 J. Intell. Prop. L. 295 (2010).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol18/iss1/10
WHAT JURY? A NEW APPROACH TO
OBVIOUSNESS AFTER KSR V TELEFLEX
Rishi S. Suthat
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................ 297
II. B ACK G RO UN D ............................................................................................. 299
A. OBVIOUSNESS IN GENERAL ......................... ..... 299
1. Ongins in Hotchkiss ............................... 299
2. Statutoy Adopion in 35 U.S.C J 103.......................................... 299
B. THE APPROACH PRIOR TO THE CREATION OF THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT ...................................... 300
1. Seventh and Ninth CircuitApproach................................................ 300
2. Frfth Circuit Approach...................................... .......... 301
C. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ............................... 301
D. KSR V. TELEFLEX ...................................... 302
1. Substantive Changes...................................... 302
2. ProceduralQ ueszons......................................................................... 303
E. QUESTIONS OF JURIES' ADEQUACY IN PATENT CASES................. 303
F. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS ..................................... 304
1. SpeialiZed Courts................................. 304
2. D iminishment ofjuU 's Role ............................................................. 305
G. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT............................................................. 307
H. INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES......................................................... 308
III. ANALYSIS ................................................. 309
A. KSR SAYS OBVIOUSNESS IS FOR THE JUDGE.................................... 309
B. OTHER SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS SUPPORT THE
ARGUMENT THAT JUDGES ARE THE PROPER
DECISION-MAKERS ..................................... 311
* Rishi Suthar is a third-year student at the University of Georgia School of Law. He received
his B.S. in electrical engineering at the University of Maryland, College Park in 2005. Prior to
attending law school, Rishi was a patent examiner for over three years at the United States Patent
and Trademark Office.
295
1
Suthar: What Jury? A New Approach to Obviousness after KSR v. Teleflex
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2010
296 J. INTELL PROP. L [Vol. 18:295
C. POLICY REASONS ....................................... 312
1. Policies Acknowledged by the Supreme Court.................................... 312
2. ConsitutionalArgument ......... ..................................... 314
3. Problem s on A ppeal......................................................................... 314
4. E ducation ............. ............................... ....................... 315
D. SCOPE OF JURY TRIAL RIGHT ON QUESTIONS OF
O BVIO U SN ESS ....................................................................................... 316
1. The Seventh Amendment and the Complexity Exception.................. 316
2. U nform ity........................................................................................ 319
E. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM: ADVISORY VERDICTS............................. 320
1. Benefits ......................... . . . ........................... 321
2. Other A reas of Patent Law .............................................................. 321
3. W ithin Congress's Power.................................................................. 322
IV. CONCLUSION ......................... ......................................... 322
2
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol18/iss1/10
WHATJURY?
I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of patents is widely known around the world, as evidenced
by the fact that the costs associated with obtaining and maintaining patents
represents a large portion of our economy. Excluding a company's research
and development (R&D) costs, a patent can cost between $10,000 and $25,000
to obtain.' To get patent rights in an additional nine countries, the cost can
skyrocket to between $160,000 and $330,000.2 Considering R&D costs for
each invention, these figures escalate even more quickly.
Globally, most countries spend between 0.25% and 1% of their gross
domestic product (GDP) on R&D.3 Some of the more active countries, such as
the United States, Japan, and Korea, spend between 2.7% to 3.2% of their GDP
on R&D.4 For computer companies, these costs average almost 10% of their
total sales.5 The pharmaceutical industry is even higher at 16.1% of their total
sales.6 In 2006, the top R&D spenders spent over $7 billion each.7
High R&D expenditures provide an incentive for companies to obtain the
necessary protection on their inventions to protect their investments.8 For
many companies, the income from royalties could provide a significant source
of income for the business.9 IBM, for example, consistently earns more than $1
billion annually in licensing, while Qualcomm earned over $1.8 billion from
technology licensing in 2005 alone.'0
With all these resources going into R&D, a company's perceived value of
their patent portfolio can be exceptionally high. However, companies
sometimes find out only through lengthy litigation that a patent they are holding
Joe Hadzima, The Importance of Patents: It Pays to Know Patent Rules, at 2, http://web.mit.edu/
e-club/hadzima/pdf/the-importance-of-patents.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2010).
2 Id. (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: FEDERAL ACTION
NEEDED TO HELP SMALL BUSINESSES ADDRESS FOREIGN PATENT CHALLENGES, No. 02-789, at
102 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02789.pdf).
3 U.N. EDUC. SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL ORG. (UNESCO), Inst. for Statistics, A Global
Perspective on Research and Development, at 5, U.N. Doc. UIS/FS/07/05 (Oct. 2009), available at
http://www.uis.unesco.org/template/pdf/S&T/Factsheet-No2_ST_2009_EN.pdf.
4 Id
s R&D Scoreboard: Software & Computer Services - Sector Summary, http://www.innovat
ion.gov.uk/rd scoreboard/default.asp?p=45 (last visited Oct. 18, 2009).
6 Id.
7 Barry Jaruzelski & Kevin Dehoff, The Customer Connection: The Global Innovation 1000, 49
STRATEGY+BUS. 68, 77 (2007), available at http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/GlobalInnov
ation_1000_2007.pdf.
8 Adam Shartzer, Patent Lirgation 101: Empirical Support for the Patent Pilot Prmgram's Solution to
Increase judial Experience in Patent Law, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 191, 209 (2008).
9 Id.
10 Id. See also Bruce v. Bigelow, Patent Payof SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 14, 2006, at H1,
available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/articlelink/fallbrook2/fallbrook2.htmrl (discussing
revenues from patent licensing).
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and relying on is nonetheless invalidated due to the obviousness of the
invention. Given the significant time and money these companies put into
obtaining patents, there is a need to have a predictable method of ascertaining
what can render an existing patent obvious and how this determination is made
in court. Without any sort of calculable standard, companies may reasonably
decide to allocate their R&D costs to other areas of their businesses in fear of
wasteful spending. Unfortunately, this could ultimately stifle the much needed
innovation in our economy.
The Supreme Court's 2007 decision in KSR Int'l v. Teleflex, Inc." changed the
obviousness standards. The Court effectively made existing patents "easier to
invalidate" because a wider variety of prior art can now be used to prove an
invention was obvious. 2 However, the Court raised procedural questions
about how this determination is to be made, particularly whether the ultimate
determination of obviousness is to be made by a judge or a jury.13
This Note considers the procedural effect of KSR on obviousness
determinations and proposes changes to our current system in light of KSR.
Part II of this Note will begin by analyzing the background of patent
obviousness, and how this determination has been made throughout time and
in different jurisdictions. The differing treatment of this issue in the past
illustrates the need for a single, more reliable standard. This Part will also
discuss the substantive changes KSR has made to obviousness. Additionally,
this Part will discuss the role of juries in patent infringement cases and the
potential problems that arise from their role. Finally, this Part will discuss some
of the proposed solutions to these problems and conclude with a summary of
the international approaches on this issue.
Part III of this Note will begin by analyzing the procedural impact of KSR
on whether juries should be entitled to make the final determination of
obviousness. Specifically, this Note will argue that under the KSR decision, the
ultimate determination is for a judge, rather than a jury. Other Supreme Court
decisions and policy reasons support this view as well.14 This Part will also
argue that the Seventh Amendment should not apply to obviousness
determinations due to the complexity of patent suits. Part III will also discuss a
proposal for change in our current system. In particular, this Part will argue
that the best change would be to reduce the jury's function on questions of
obviousness to a non-binding, advisory role. This "advisory jury" idea is
consistent with the Supreme Court's view in KSR.
11 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
12 Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and the Boundaries of Technologv-Intensive Firms,
157 U. PA. L. REv. 1649, 1674 (2009).
13 See infra Part III.D.2.
14 See infra Part IH.B-c.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. OBVIOUSNESS IN GENERAL
Patent validity often depends on a determination of whether the claimed
invention was obvious at the time the invention was made.15
1. Origins in Hotchkiss. The rationale for the obviousness requirement is to
award patents only for subject matter that is truly inventive and beyond the
"ordinary skill in a particular field."' 6 The Supreme Court in 1850 realized this
necessity in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.'7  In Hotchkiss, an inventor was granted a
patent for a doorknob, where the improvement was the manufacturing of the
knob out of clay, rather than from more traditional materials such as metal or
wood.'8 The Court explained that without an obviousness requirement, a
separate patent could be awarded for practically any variation of an existing
product.19 The Court in Hotchkiss said that awarding a patent for any minor
variation in an existing product or invention would be "violating the spirit of
the act of Congress."20  The Court therefore adopted the obviousness
requirement into the U.S. system of patent law, requiring patentable inventions
to be "the work of [a] skillful mechanic, not that of [an] inventor." 21
The Supreme Court later summarized this doctrine in Cuno Engineering Corp.
v. Automatic Devices Corp.,22 explaining that in order to mature into a patent, the
invention "must reveal the flash of creative genius[,] not merely the skill of the
calling."23 No matter how useful the invention might be, if it does not meet
this requirement, then the inventor should not be awarded an exclusive right for
the use and sale of the invention.24
2. Statutory Adoption in 35 U.S.C g 103. In the Patent Act of 1952, over one
hundred years after Hotchkiss, Congress statutorily adopted the obviousness
requirement into 35 U.S.C. § 103.25 Under this statute, a patent is obvious "if
the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
15 See, e.g., KSR, 550 U.S. at 398; i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir.
2009); Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Proctor & Gamble
Co. v. Paragon Trade Brands, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 547 (D. Del. 1997).
16 Christopher A. Brown, Developments in Intellectual Prqpery Law, 41 IND. L. REV. 1139, 1140
(2008).
17 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
18 Id. at 258.
19 Id at 260.
20 Id
21 Id. at 267.
2 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
2 Id. at 91.
24 Id
25 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2010).
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time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill." 26 The statute
did not provide much guidance on how to determine whether or not an
invention is obvious.
In Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 27 the Supreme Court laid out a
multi-factor analysis to make this determination.28 The Graham factual inquiry
required that "the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined;
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained;
the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art [is to be] resolved"; and secondary
considerations such as "commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs,
failure of others, etc." is to be utilized. 29 One of the main goals of this
obviousness test was to obtain "uniformity and definiteness." 30  Today, this
Graham analysis is still critical in determining obviousness.3'
Later courts have narrowed the obviousness analysis with a teaching,
suggestion, or motivation (TSM) test.32 This test requires there be some
evidence, either from the prior art, a person of ordinary skill, or the "from the
nature of the problem itself," to combine references in a showing of
obviousness. 33 Over time, the obviousness analysis under the TSM test turned
into a strict application, requiring some sort of concrete proof of compatibility
between the two references that is "clear and particular."3
B. THE APPROACH PRIOR TO THE CREATION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Before the adoption of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
1982,3s there was a split among circuits on the jury's role in the ultimate
determination of obviousness in patent infringement trials.
1. Seventh and Ninth Circuit Approach. In the Seventh Circuit, the court held
that it was an error for the jury to decide the ultimate question of obviousness.3 6
The Ninth Circuit followed this view in Sarkisian v. Winn-Pmof Cop.37 That
court explicitly stated that a jury's ultimate determination of obviousness is
26 Id
27 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
28 Id at 17.
29 Id. at 17-18.
3 Id. at 18.
31 See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007).
32 See, e.g., Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 78 F.3d 540, 550 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
33 Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
3 Winner Int'l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing In re
Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cit. 1999)).
3s Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
36 Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1343 (7th Cit. 1983). See also Dual Mfg. &
Eng'g, Inc. v. Burris Indus., Inc., 619 F.2d 660, 667 (7th Cit. 1980) (explaining that the court has
the "obligation to decide the ultimate issue of obviousness").
37 688 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1982).
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advisory and nonbinding to the court.38 The determination of obviousness was
a "question of law" and was subject to the court's "independent review." 39
Thus, the Ninth Circuit made it clear that the judge has the final say on the
ultimate validity of a patent.
2. Fifth Circuit Approach. In the Fifth Circuit, the jury had a much more
powerful role. In addition to the Graham factual inquiries, the jury was required
to make the final determination of obviousness in patent infringement cases. 0
Later, however, another Fifth Circuit case appeared to disagree with this
result.41 Instead, the court said that obviousness and validity were "clearly legal,
not factual" and "the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law." 42 Since
the Federal Circuit began hearing appeals for patent cases later that year, the
tension around this issue within the Fifth Circuit was never resolved.
C. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
The Federal Circuit closely parallels the earlier view of the Fifth Circuit in
that the jury is entitled to decide the ultimate question of obviousness in the
Federal Circuit. 43 In Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the court reasoned that the
Seventh Amendment affords juries the right to decide matters in complex
patent cases, just like juries have the authority to render verdicts in complicated
products liability and medical malpractice cases.44 Connell also analogized the
"reasonable person" in negligence cases to one of ordinary "skill in the art"
when dealing with questions of obviousness.45 Even though obviousness is a
legal conclusion, the jury can still make this determination so long as the jury
has "appropriate instructions on the law."46
In Trans-World Manufacturing Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc.,47 the Federal
Circuit affirmed the practice of allowing the jury to decide the final question of
obviousness. 48 The Federal Circuit stated that there would be a large influx of
motions for directed verdicts if the judge were allowed to make the ultimate
38 Id. at 651. See also Velo-Bind, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 647 F.2d 965, 971 (9th
Cir. 1981) (holding that a jury can make the finding on obviousness, but "the conclusion of
validity is ultimately one of law").
39 Sarkidian, 688 F.2d at 651.
4 See Control Components, Inc. v. Valtek, Inc., 609 F.2d 763, 767 (5th Cir, 1980) (requiring
jury to determine factual inquiries).
41 Baumstimler v. Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061, 1070 (5th Cir. 1982).
42 Id
43 See Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
44 Id.
45 Id
46 Id.
47 750 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
48 Subsequent decisions by the Federal Circuit followed this view. See, e.g., United States
Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v.
Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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determination, and the jury's role would become nonbinding and advisory.49
Moreover, advisory opinions such as these are limited only to cases where there
is no right to a trial by jury, which does not include patent cases.50
In Richardson v. SuZuki Motor Co., a California district court followed the view
taken by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits. 5 ' However, the Federal Circuit on
appeal made it clear that those circuits' views are not followed by the Federal
Circuit. The Court found that there was no precedent in the Federal Circuit of
this "discredited procedure of advisory verdicts," and affirmed the idea that
juries can decide questions of obviousness and validity.52 This is the approach
that the Federal Circuit applies today in patent infringement trials. 53
D. KSR V. TELEFLEX
1. Substantive Changes. KSR has had a significant impact on the substantive
issue of obviousness. Teleflex Inc. owned a patent for a pedal assembly with an
electronic position sensor, while KSR International, Co. owned a patent for a
mechanically actuated throttle.54 In order to adapt this invention to vehicles
with electronic throttles, KSR included a position sensor in its design.55
Teleflex sued KSR for patent infringement and KSR won on a motion for
summary judgment at the district court level.56 The Federal Circuit vacated that
decision, reasoning that the district court applied the obviousness test too
leniently.57
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit.5 8 The
Court rejected the strict and rigid application of the TSM test that the Federal
Circuit applied.59 The Court held there are other ways to show that an
invention is obvious.60 For instance, one might ask whether the combination
was obvious to try or if the combination was within the realm of common
sense.61 This broader and more flexible test will likely lead to many more pre-
49 Perkin-Elmer, 732 F.2d at 895 n.5.
50 Id
51 Id
52 Id
s3 See Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Group, Inc. 554 F.3d 1010, 1020-21 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
54 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007).
55 Id
56 Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 581 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
57 Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 Fed. Appx. 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
58 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 400 (2007).
59 Id. at 415. For an explanation of the TSM test, see Harold R. Brown, III, Finding Moiveaion,
Teaching, or Suggestion in the PnorArt, 86J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 809 (2004). See also supra
Part II.A.2.
60 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 402 (2007).
61 Id
[Vol. 18:295302
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KSR patents being challenged, 62 as well as greater difficulty in obtaining a patent
from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).63 The Court's
decision in KSR did not overrule the Graham analysis in obviousness
determinations, but instead clarified that the obviousness analysis should remain
flexible.
2. ProceduralQuestions. Aside from clarifying the obviousness standard, KSR
has raised procedural questions. The Court affirmed Graham, which held that
the "ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal determination."6 The Court
also mentions a "court" several times when discussing obviousness
determinations. 65 One must wonder why the Court found it necessary to make
these statements. It is possible that the Court could be hinting at a procedural
change in patent cases, but the scope of this potential change is not clear.
E. QUESTIONS OF JURIES' ADEQUACY IN PATENT CASES
There has long been a dispute about what role juries should play in patent
infringement cases. Specifically, the difficulty in understanding patents, a desire
for uniformity, and the black box effect of the jury's verdict are causes for
concern when juries render decisions relating to patent infringement.
One of the main problems is the inherent complexity of the patented subject
matter.66 The subject matter of claimed inventions is unquestionably more
complex than many other areas of law.67 Lay jurors, many with no technical
background, may have a difficult time understanding and determining fact
intensive questions relating to scientific subject matter.68 This difficulty could
lead to inaccurate verdicts, which not only result in unpredictability, but also
questions the availability of a true judgment on the merits in these complex
patent cases.
The Supreme Court realized the complexity problem relating to patents in
Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc.69 The issue in Markman was whether the
interpretation of the text of patent claims is a question for the judge or a
62 Judy Naamat, Computing the Effect of KSR, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 516, 530
(2008).
63 See Joshua D. Sarnoff & Christopher M. Holman, Recent Developments Affecting the Enforcement,
Procurement, and Licensing of Research ToolPatents, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1299, 1345 (2008).
64 KSR, 550 U.S. at 427. See also Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17
(1966).
65 KSR, 550 U.S. at 407, 418.
6 See Gregory D. Leibold, Comment, In Junes We Do Not Trust: Appellate Review of Patent-
Infringement Litgation, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 623 (1996) (discussing juries' difficulty in understanding
the technical subject matter in patents).
67 Arti K. Rai, Specialted Trial Courts: Concentrating Experise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
877, 878 (2002).
68 Id. at 895.
69 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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question for the jury.70 Citing concern for uniformity, the Court reasoned that a
jury's construction of a patent claim may not be predictable in a later action,
leaving open the possibility of different interpretations of the same claim
terms.7 ' Because of this, the Court held patent claim construction was better
suited for judges rather than juries.72 As a result, pre-trial hearings, called
"Markman hearings," are conducted to interpret the meaning of the claim
language. 73 In these hearings, the trial judge relies on evidence from both
parties in the litigation as well as "experts skilled in the art" in order to
determine how a claim should be constructed.74
Another major, and perhaps more important, problem with juries in these
cases is the "black box" effect.7 5 With a "black box" verdict, the possibility of
overturning on appeal becomes extremely difficult.7 6 This is because the verdict
forms are not specific enough to capture the detailed analysis required in these
complex cases.77 Without evidence of the jury's actual analysis, a court on
appeal can only presume that the jury made the correct finding, thus shielding
any flaws the jury may have actually made.78
F. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
There are several possible solutions to alleviate the problems associated with
lay juries in complex patent cases.
1. Spenaliged Courts. A widely proposed solution is to have "specialized"
courts.7 9 One option is having specialized judges who are experts in patent law
and have technical backgrounds. 0 The benefits of having a specialized judge
include a potential mitigation of forum shopping by plaintiffs, better efficiency
and docket management, and increased predictability and uniformity.8 '
However, this could have the effect of increased reversals on appeal, since these
questions of law would be entitled to a de novo review by the Federal Circuit
70 Id at 372.
71 Id. at 391.
72 Id. at 388-90.
73 Andrew Auchincloss Lundgren, Perspectives on Patent Claim Construction: Re-Examining
Markman v. Westview Instruments Through Linguistic and Cognitive Theories of Decisionmaking, 12 U.
BAL T. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 173, 201-02 (2004).
7 Id. at 202.
7s Kimberly A. Moore, judges, juries, and Patent Cases - An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99
MICH. L. REv. 365, 401 (2000).
76 Id
n Id.
78 Id
79 Rai, supra note 67, at 877.
0 Leibold, supra note 66, at 648.
s1 Kevin A. Meehan, Shopping for Expedient, Inexpensive & Predictable Patent Litigation, 2008 B.C.
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 102901, 1 22 (2008).
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judge. 82 Another problem would be the cost and difficulty of appointing new
judges that meet these standards.83
A better solution might be to adopt specialized juries.84  Similar to a
specialized judge above, a specialized jury would be composed of individuals
with strong technical backgrounds that are more likely to comprehend the
patented subject matter.85 A jury that is better equipped to understand these
technical concepts would theoretically be more likely to engage in the proper
analysis of the facts and surrounding circumstances.86 Not only could a
specialized jury better understand the material, the attorneys for both sides
would most likely present more complex evidence for the jury to consider.87
This could lead to a more accurate analysis by the jury since the jury need not
rely on overly simplified expressions of the facts that might distort the true
nature of the invention.88 However, a major hurdle with specialized juries lies
within selection.89 There is no easy way to determine which members of the
population are qualified to sit on a specialized jury.90
2. Diminishment of Jug's Role. Instead of a specialized court, with a
specialized judge or a specialized jury, another possible modification is to
change the jury's overall role in patent cases. One option is to eliminate juries
from patent cases altogether. While this may have the benefit of mitigating an
incorrect application of the law, this would certainly invoke Seventh
Amendment concerns.91
Another option is to diminish the power of the jury's ultimate determination
of obviousness to a nonbinding, advisory role, similar to the view accepted in
the Ninth Circuit.92 Under this view, the jury would be required to make all of
82 Leibold, supra note 66, at 648.
83 Meehan, supra note 81, 1 23.
8 Leibold, supra note 66, at 648-53; see also Beth Z. Shaw, Judging juries: Evaluating Renewed
Proposals for SpeciaiZed juries From a Pubc Choice Perspective, 2006 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 3 (2006)
(discussing both the procedural and substantive advantages of having specialized juries in
complex patent cases).
85 Leibold, supra note 66, at 649.
86 Id.
87 Shaw, supra note 84, at 76.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 5.
90 Id. at 80.
91 See, e.g., Brian D. Coggio & Timothy E. DeMasi, The Right to a jury Trial in Actions for Patent
Infingement and Suits for Declaratory judgment, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 205
(2002) (discussing the right to a trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment for patent
infringement suits where the plaintiff seeks damages); Philippe Signore, On the Rok of juries in
Patent Liigation (pt.1), 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 791 (2001) (arguing that Seventh
Amendment rights are preserved even when the subject matter of a lawsuit may be too complex
for a jury to fully comprehend).
92 See supra Part II.B.1.
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the Graham factual inquiries, but their final determination of obviousness would
not be binding on the court.93
A third approach would be to limit all of the jury's findings on obviousness,
including the factual inquiries, to an advisory role. This approach, unlike the
previous one, has not been adopted by any court in the past. However, the
concept is not unheard of in the U.S. federal court system. Under Rule 39(c) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, originally adopted in 1937, advisory juries
are allowed in limited situations, specifically those not including a right to a trial
by jury.94
Under the current U.S. system, it is not clear whether the use of an advisory
jury is permitted in patent infringement cases since parties in these actions are
given a right to a trial by jury. One court took the approach that the court
cannot, on its own, call for an advisory jury even when both parties have waived
the right to trial by jury.95 However, Rule 39(c) is silent about the possibility of
advisory juries where both parties choose to waive their right to a jury trial. 96 A
Second Circuit court took the approach that advisory verdicts may be proper if
the right to a jury is present but is waived.97 More recent cases agree with this
construction of Rule 39(c).98 Despite this interpretation of Rule 39(c), the
Supreme Court has stated that an advisory jury cannot be a substitute for a
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.99
The Federal Circuit has recently accepted the idea of allowing an advisory
jury on the issue of ensnarement in patent infringement suits.100 Although the
ensnarement doctrine is different than obviousness, the acceptance of the
advisory verdict in this context shows that Rule 39(c) can play at least a limited
role in patent infringement suits. Advisory verdicts can be used where there is
no right to a trial by jury and "there are special factors in [an] action which
suggest that a jury composed of members of the community would provide [a
court] valuable guidance in making its own findings and conclusions."' 0 '
93 See supra Part II.B. 1.
94 FED. R. Civ. P. 39(c) ("In an action not triable of right by a jury, the court, on motion or on
its own: (1) may try any issue with an advisory jury.").
95 Hargrove v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 125 F.2d 225-28 (10th Cir. 1942).
96 See 8 JAMEs WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 39.40[2] (3d ed. 2009).
9 (American) Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Timms & Howard, Inc., 108 F.2d 497, 500
(2d Cir. 1939).
98 See, e.g., Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Smith, 180 F.2d 371, 374 (8th Cir. 1950) (finding the court has
the "right to call a jury in an advisory capacity and to submit such issues of fact as he may elect"
in equitable cases); Computer Sys. Eng'g, Inc. v. Qantel Corp., 571 F. Supp. 1365, 1373 (D. Mass.
1983) (holding that courts have the authority to use advisory juries when parties have waived their
jury trial right since the end effect is still a "court trial" because the jury acts only as an aid to the
judge's findings of fact).
9 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337 n.24 (1979).
100 See Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
101 Skoldberg v. Villani, 601 F. Supp. 981, 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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Advisory verdicts are helpful in other contexts, such as situations involving
unique or extraordinary circumstances, actions involving both "jury and nonjury
claims or issues," and other cases where there is a desire to conserve judicial
resources.102 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make it clear that even when
an advisory jury is used, the court must still "find the facts specially and state its
conclusions of law separately." 03
G. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
In any situation where the role of the jury is diminished, the Seventh
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution will undoubtedly be a concern. The
Seventh Amendment states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.10
The Supreme Court stated in Markman that the right to a jury -trial exists
under the Seventh Amendment in patent infringement cases. 0 5 In terms of
claim construction, the Court in Markman analyzed the Seventh Amendment
right under a "historical test." 06 Under this "historical test," the Court looks at
whether the cause of action is one that was "tried at law at the time of the
founding or is at least analogous to one that was," and if so, "whether the
particular trial decision must fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance
of the common-law right as it existed in 1791,"o10 when the Seventh
Amendment was passed.
The Court ultimately found that the usurpation of the jury's role in patent
claim construction was consistent with the Seventh Amendment. 0 8 However,
in taking claim construction matters away from the jury, the Supreme Court
implicitly raised an important question as to the scope of the Seventh
Amendment regarding patent cases: what types of issues might be taken away
from the jury in future cases. Given the Court's affirmation in KSR that
obviousness is a question of law, the Court left open the possibility that
102 8 JAMEs WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 39.41 (3d ed. 2009).
103 FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1).
104 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
105 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377 (1996).
106 Id. at 376.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 381-83.
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obviousness is another area of law that may be suited for judges rather than
juries.
In another context of patent cases, where only an injunction is sought
against a defendant, the plaintiff does not have a right to a trial by jury.109 This
is because injunction-only cases are equitable remedies, and thus not "common
law" remedies under the Seventh Amendment." 0
H. INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES
Many countries have different procedures than the United States has for
trying patent cases. In several industrialized nations, there is no right to a jury
trial for patent suits."' England employs two specialized courts to try patent
cases: the Patents Court and the Patents County Court.112 juries are not used in
these courts.113 Since the presiding judges work on patent cases constantly, they
become more knowledgeable in English patent law, and in many cases the
subject matter of the inventions as well.114
France and Germany are similar to England in their procedures. In France,
specialized patent courts without juries are employed to hear these cases."'
These patent courts consist of three judges, some of whom specialize in patent
actions." 6 Germany hears patent cases in their Federal Patent Court, which
consists of a panel of five judges." 7 Three judges are technical judges, while the
other two are non-technical judges." 8 Technical judges include those "having a
technical background relevant to the case," while non-technical judges possess
only a "legal background."" 9
In Japan, the validity of existing patents is at the sole discretion of the Japan
Patent Office.120 During the infringement proceedings at the district court
level, a patent suit is tried by a panel of judges.121 Consequently, like England,
109 Signore, supra note 91, at 812.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 794-95.
112 Id. at 794. See also John B. Pegram, Should There be a U.S. Trial Court nith a Spedati.aion in
Patent Litgation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 766, 773-75 (2000) (discussing the
arrangement of the English legal system for patent related cases).
113 Pegram, supra note 112, at 774.
114 Signore, supra note 91, at 794.
115 Id
116 Ladas & Parry, LLP, Patent Liigation in France, http://www.ladas.com/Litigation/ForeignPat
entLitigation/FrancePatent_Lit.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
117 Signore, supra note 91, at 794. See also Volker Hamm, Tps on Fiing Patent Vaidly Actions,
MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Sept. 1, 2004, http://www.managingip.com/article/4734
27/Tips-on-filing-patent-validity-actions.htm1.
11s Signore, supra note 91, at 794.
119 Id.
120 Pegram, supra note 112, at 776-77.
121 Id. at 776-77.
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juries do not play a role in this element of patent infringement and invalidity in
Japan. 122
III. ANALYSIS
With the circuit split on obviousness prior to the creation of the Federal
Circuit, it was unclear whether this determination was to be made by a judge or
jury. 123 When the Supreme Court clarified the obviousness doctrine recently in
KSR, the question was brought up again. The language in the KSR opinion
sheds light on the answer to this question. In answering this question, this
Analysis will first discuss the KSR opinion itself. The Court offers several clues
that the ultimate determination is to be made by a judge, rather than a jury.
Other precedents of the Court, such as Graham, also support this conclusion.
Next, this Analysis will discuss the policy reasons for agreeing with the
approach of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.
Although KSR supports the proposition that juries should no longer have
the final say on obviousness, a related question that must be answered is what
role, if any, juries should have in the determination. To answer this question,
this Analysis will discuss the Seventh Amendment, and in particular, the need
for a complexity exception in patent infringement cases. This Analysis will
conclude with a proposal for reform of the U.S. system, specifically that
advisory verdicts should be used to aid the judge on the determination of
obviousness.
A. KSR SAYS OBVIOUSNESS IS FOR THE JUDGE
As discussed above, KSR expanded the obviousness doctrine beyond the
accepted TSM test.124 There are suggestions for a procedural change in the way
this determination is to be made. Since the issue on appeal was the extent to
which the TSM test should apply in these findings, the Court did not focus on
this question.125 However, there are numerous indications in the Court's
opinion that the judge, rather than the jury, is to make the final finding on
obviousness.
First, the Court never states anywhere in the opinion that a jury is to
conduct the obviousness analysis or make a final determination on obviousness.
Rather, the Court mentions that "a court, or patent examiner" is to conduct the
Graham analysis to determine whether a claim is obvious under 35 U.S.C.§ 103.126 Although an argument can be made that the Supreme Court was
122 Signore, supra note 91, at 795.
123 See supra Part II.B.
124 See supra Part II.D.
125 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007).
126 Id.
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referring to the courts as a whole (i.e., including the jury), other language
contradicts this construction. When read in context with the rest of the
opinion, it seems clear that the Court was referring to the judges of the lower
courts when it discusses what a "court" should do in the obviousness analysis.
For example, in discussing the procedural history of the case, the Supreme
Court refers to the District Court numerous times.127 The Supreme Court
discusses the analysis performed by the District Court on the issue of
obviousness.128 Since the case was only at the summary judgment stage, there
was no trial and therefore no jury in the case. With this in mind, the Supreme
Court's reference to the "District Court" in this context was undoubtedly a
reference to Judge Lawrence P. Zatkoff, the district judge hearing the case.129
The Supreme Court further mentions that the court of appeals, "the court,"
reversed because a trial should have been conducted.130 As with the references
to the district court judge earlier, these references are clearly to the judges in the
court of appeals.
Furthering the argument for this construction is the Court's reference to the
patent examiner in making these determinations.131 The USPTO does not
employ a group of patent examiners to make obviousness determinations.
Rather, a single patent examiner generally decides whether a claim satisfies the
obviousness requirement under the Graham analysis.132 This single examiner,
acting as a sole fact finder, is much more like a district judge than a jury. Even
when an applicant believes an examiner's rejection of their application is
improper, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences employs judges, not
juries, to decide whether the inventions were obvious over the cited prior art.133
Therefore, the Court clearly was not referring to. any procedure relating to juries
when the Court mentioned examiners in KSR.
When read in the proper context, the Supreme Court is speaking of judges,
not juries, when they require that "a court must ask whether the improvement
is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their
established functions,"'1' or they state that it "will be necessary for a court to
look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents."135 From this language in
127 Id. at 412-13.
128 Id.
129 See Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 581 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
1 KSR, 550 U.S. at 415.
131 Id. at 407.
132 David V. Radack, Understanding U.S. Patent File Histories, The Minerals, Metals & Materials
Society, Feb. 2003, available at http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/JOM/matters/matters-0302.
html.
133 F. Scorr KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 107 (4th ed.
2008).
134 KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
135 Id. at 418.
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KSR, it is clear that a judge is to play a large role in the analysis and outcome of
a claim of obviousness.
The Supreme Court in KSR also plainly states that the "ultimate judgment of
obviousness is a legal determination." 36 The court distinguishes this final
judgment of obviousness from other questions of fact that may need to be
resolved, presumably the critical factors in the Graham obviousness analysis. 37
In walking through the analysis for the patent at issue, the Court seeks to
answer the "legal question" of whether the particular placement of the sensor
on the pedal assembly is obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art.138 It is well
settled that questions of law are the province of the court, distinguished from
questions of fact, which are for a jury. 139 Mixed questions of law and fact may
be either for a judge or a jury, depending on the context.'1 The Court's
multiple references to obviousness as a "legal" issue seem to make it clear that
obviousness truly is a question of law, rather than a question of fact or even a
mixed question. Therefore, as a question of law, this determination would be
properly made by a judge rather than a jury. Combining this "legal
determination" language with the court's numerous instructions to the "court"
in performing the analysis, the KSR opinion as a whole provides a strong
indication that the judge has the final say on the ultimate outcome of
obviousness in patent infringement cases.
B. OTHER SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS SUPPORT THE ARGUMENT THAT
JUDGES ARE THE PROPER DECISION-MAKERS
The theory that KSR affords more power to judges is supported by other
opinions of the Supreme Court. In Graham the Court made it clear that "the
ultimate question of patent validity is one of law." 141 Even prior to Graham, the
Supreme Court in Mahn v. Harwood similarly stated that patentability is a
question of law.142
The current practice of the Federal Circuit in allowing juries to determine
obviousness seems to be inconsistent with these precedents. The fact that the
Supreme Court found it necessary in KSR to reaffirm the language from its
precedents shows that obviousness is still a legal determination and may be
hinting that the Federal Circuit's approach is improper.
136 Id. at 427 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966)).
137 Id
138 Id. at 424-25.
139 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996) (quoting Winans v.
Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 338 (1853)).
140 United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995).
141 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
142 112 U.S. 354, 358 (1884).
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C. POLICY REASONS
Other reasons support the theory that the Court in KSR should reserve the
obviousness determination for a judge. The Supreme Court has mentioned the
importance of promoting inventive progress, uniformity, and definiteness when
dealing with patent cases.143 The U.S. Constitution provides insight on allowing
a judge to make the obviousness determination.144 There are also problems on
appeal when allowing a jury to make the determination.145 Finally, the relative
lack of education of a lay jury when compared to registered patent attorneys
and patent examiners supports the theory that a jury should not make the final
determination.'146
1. Policies Acknowledged by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court on occasion
has reviewed the obviousness standard and has aimed for several goals in
refining the analysis. Going back to the Court's decision in Hotchkiss, when the
standard was first adopted, the purpose for this requirement was to assure that
only truly novel inventions were issued patents and enforced in the courts.147
Without this requirement, minor changes to an invention could result in
significantly more patents being awarded, which could end up diluting the
overall value of a patent.
The Court expanded on this rationale in later cases. In Atlanic Works v.
Brad,' 48 the Court explained that a lack of an obviousness standard can
ultimately obstruct inventive progress. 149 By securing a patent he does not
deserve, the inventor has the ability "to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the
country, without contributing anything to the real advancement of the art." 50
Businesses in the end will become fearful of being sued by the holders of these
patents.151
The Court in Graham acknowledged that the purpose of the Patent Act of
1952 in statutorily adopting the obviousness requirement was to achieve
"uniformity and definiteness."' 52 With this policy in mind, the Court derived
the famous Graham factors, which still control today. More recently, the Court
reemphasized the importance of uniformity in patent law in Markman,153 where
the Court deemed it necessary for judges to engage in patent claim
143 See infra Part III.c. 1.
144 See infra Part III.c.2.
145 See infra Part III.c.3.
146 See infra Part III.c.4.
147 Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1851).
14 107 U.S. 192 (1883).
149 Id. at 200. See aLso KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007).
150 Ati Works, 107 U.S. at 200.
151 Id.
152 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
153 Markman v. Wesrview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996).
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construction.15 4 The Markman Court held that uniformity in the field "would
'strengthen the United States patent system in such a way as to foster
technological growth and industrial innovation.' "155
Allowing a jury to have the final say on obviousness may not advance the
goals recognized by the Court. One study shows that juries are more likely than
judges to hold patents valid in infringement trials.15 6 If the reason for this
discrepancy is that juries are less likely to find an invention invalid due to
obviousness, there is a possibility that the standard may be applied too leniently
and non-deserving patents will be upheld. Due to its stifling effect on
innovation, this is precisely the type of conduct the Court aims to avoid. Given
the slump in the world's economy today and the consequent need for major
technological advances, such as in the area of renewable fuels, a disincentive on
ingenuity is hardly desirable.
In looking at innovations in our society, technology arguably has become
drastically more complex than it was 150 years ago when the Court adopted the
obviousness requirement. Complex semiconductor devices, for example,
control many aspects of our daily routines. The widely known Moore's Law
says that the number of transistors in chips will double once every two years.157
More than forty years later, Intel's development is still following this
prediction. 58  Not only does this mean increased functioning and
implementation of these chips, but also major advances in the systems that
produce these chips on a large scale.
One commentator has suggested a theory of "accelerating returns" in
technology.1'59 In his essay, Kurzweil suggests that technology is advancing at
an exponential rate, rather than a linear rate.160 Under this view, we will see the
equivalent of 20,000 years of progress in the present century.161 This would
tend to show that patents issued today are significantly more complex than
those in previous years, since patents tend to build on and improve upon prior
technology.
With the increasing complexity of patents, uniformity is not likely if a jury,
without any intervention by a judge, can ultimately decide a patent's
obviousness. Since juries will likely miscomprehend the subject matter of these
ever-advancing patents, the probability of error remains high, resulting in an
improper finding on obviousness. Federal judges, on the other hand, will
154 Id.
1ss Id. at 390 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 20 (1981)).
156 Moore, supra note 75, at 392.
157 Moore's Law: Made Real by Intel Innovations, http://www.intel.com/technology/mooresl
aw/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
158 Id.
15 Ray Kurzweil, The Law of Accelerating Returns (Mar. 7, 2001), http://www.kurzweilai.net/
articles/art0l34.html?printable=1.
160 Id.
161 Id
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become more experienced as they hear more patent cases, and they are certainly
more likely to apply the law properly. This idea can be seen with seasoned
patent attorneys, who arguably become more adapt at understanding new
technologies as they gain more experience. At least some judicial involvement
should be mandated on these findings of obviousness if the policies laid out by
the Court are to be advanced.
2. Constitutional Argument. Patents are granted under Article I of the
Constitution, which gives Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."l 62 Clearly, the
founders' key goal here was to encourage innovation. However, this goal is not
achieved when patent litigation and validity becomes unpredictable due to a
jury's lack of comprehension of the issues. As mentioned above, the increase in
the rate of technological advancement could confuse juries and ultimately stifle
innovation, rather than promote it.163
Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion in Shult( v. Moorel64 is also appealing.
He argues that patent validity is a constitutional question and therefore one that
the court, rather than the jury, should decide.165 While factual determinations
are necessary, the test to ascertain whether or not a patent is invalid requires
"reasoned elaboration," which is a sufficient rationale for the argument that it is
an abdication of judicial duties to allow constitutional question of this
magnitude to be decided by a jury, especially when the rationale for their
verdicts could be missing altogether.166
3. Problems on Appeal. Justice Douglas also briefly discusses the "black box"
theory of the jury. 167 This is another compelling reason why juries should not
have the sole power to render a patent invalid due to obviousness. If the
USPTO renders an undesirable decision of patentability, patent applicants still
have an appeal process they can go through.'6 8 However, by treating questions
of obviousness as a purely factual question for the jury, any flawed reasoning
will be unreviewable on appeal.169 When the complex subject matter of patent
suits increases the probability of an erroneous understanding, a check on the
jury's finding is necessary. Because of this potential problem, a party in court
162 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
163 See supra Part III.C.1.
16 419 U.S. 930 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
165 Id. at 931-32.
166 Id. at 932.
167 Id. See also Moore, supra note 75, at 401.
168 Schulr, 419 U.S. at 932. See also 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) ("The Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences shall, on written appeal of an applicant, review adverse decisions of examiners upon
applications for patents and shall determine priority and patentability of invention in
interferences.").
169 Schul/, 419 U.S. at 932.
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might not get a fair trial on the merits, despite the extensive costs of patent
procurement and litigation.
4. Education. The USPTO recognizes the complexity in patents and has
taken measures to protect this area of law. Patent examiners, who make the
initial determination on obviousness and decide whether each patent application
has met the requirements to mature into an exclusive right, are required to have
a technical background to work at the USPTO.o70 Generally, a science or
engineering degree is required to become a patent examiner. 17' The USPTO
requirements do not stop here. A patent attorney must take a special
registration exam, separate from the attorney's state bar examination, in order
to practice before the USPTO.7 2 To be eligible to sit for the exam, the USPTO
has detailed requirements on the types of technical backgrounds required to
prosecute these applications.173
It is odd then that our system allows a jury without any technical or legal
background to make obviousness and invalidity decisions once a patent is
granted given the requirements for examiners and attorneys. A patent
examiner's obviousness analysis is no different than the type of analysis a jury
would be engaged in, yet the patent examiners are subject to rigorous training,
evidencing the USPTO's recognition of a need to assure that the analysis is
done properly. Leaving the obviousness determination in the sole hands of a
lay jury effectively undermines the stringent internal requirements the USPTO
has set forth to practice in this area of law. While a judge might not have the
requisite technical background, the federal judges over time will likely gain some
technical knowledge after hearing many patent cases. Even without any
technical experience, a judge will likely be in a better position to apply the law
properly, which can mitigate at least some of the effects of an overwhelmingly
complex case.
The obviousness analysis is made through the eyes of a person having
"ordinary skill in the art."174 The Federal Circuit holds the view that the
"person having ordinary skill in the art" under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is akin to the
"reasonable man" in negligence determinations.s75  However, this is not an
entirely fair comparison. Unlike negligence cases, the imaginary person in
patent law is not simply any reasonable man. Rather, it is more like a
reasonable inventor in the specific field at issue. For example, if an obviousness
determination needed to be made regarding a pharmaceutical patent, the
170 Working as a Patent Examiner at the USPTO, http://www.patenteducationseries.com/al
ert/patent _examiner.work uspto.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
171 Id
172 General Requirements Bulletin for Admission to the Examination for Registration to
Practice in Patent Cases Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, at 2 (Jan. 2008),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/ offices/dcom/olia/oed/grb.pdf.
173 Id. at 4-8. See also 37 C.F.R. § 11.7(a).
174 Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
175 Id.
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"reasonable man" is someone that has a Doctor of Pharmacy or perhaps a
chemical background. This is beyond the realm of knowledge of a typical lay
juror.
For the foregoing reasons, it is clear why a judge needs to be more involved
in obviousness determinations. The Supreme Court in KSR and prior cases
hinted that this sort of procedural change should be made. 7 6 Furthermore, in
light of policies laid out by the Court, the likelihood of jury incomprehension
can be detrimental to the predictable patent litigation. With the vast amounts
of money that companies are investing in R&D and patent procurement, it is
only fair to provide a true trial on the merits if those protect companies ever
become party to an infringement suit. Judicial control over juries' invalidity
determinations would provide some assurance that these investments are not
wasted. The question then becomes how much judicial control should be
given.
D. SCOPE OF JURY TRIAL RIGHT ON QUESTIONS OF OBVIOUSNESS
As discussed above, there are many reasons for taking obviousness away
from the jury altogether. Making this shift would require a judge to perform the
entire obviousness analysis, including making the factual inquiries required by
Graham.
1. The Seventh Amendment and the Complexyi Exception. As mentioned above,
the Seventh Amendment awards parties the right to a trial by jury in patent
infringement cases involving a claim for damages.'77 However, the inherent
complexity of both patent law and the subject matter of the specific technology
provide a compelling reason why the Seventh Amendment right should be
scaled back here.
The "complexity exception" to the Seventh Amendment has been argued by
scholars in the past. There are various grounds for the origin of this proposed
exception. Some argue that the exception existed, either implicitly or explicitly,
in England at the time our Bill of Rights was ratified. 78 Others base the
exception on due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution. 7 9 The idea behind this theory is straightforward: a right to a trial
by jury should not exist when issues are too complex for a jury to understand.180
In interpreting the Seventh Amendment, the practice of jury trials in
England at the time the Amendment was drafted provides helpful insight.
Under the English system, when cases were too complex for juries, the Lord
176 See supra Part III.A-B.
177 See supra Part II.G.
178 Jennifer F. Miller, Should Junes Hear Compkx Patent Cases?, 2004 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 4,
10-15 (2004).
19 Id. at 22-23.
180 Id.
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Chancellor had the power to withhold cases from the jury.'8 ' The Supreme
Court, in Thompson v. Utah,182 stated that the Seventh Amendment includes the
right to a trial by jury for actions that included this right in England at the
time.183 If a case involving a complex chemical compound that only a small
minority of the population could understand arose in England in 1791, the
Chancellor in England surely would have assumed a double role and decided
the case himself. Given that the common law at the time allowed this
exception, the Seventh Amendment should be interpreted in a way that
provides a similar exception in our trial system.
Regardless of the origin, the Supreme Court eluded to a possible complexity
exception to the Seventh Amendment in a footnote in Ross v. Bernhard.184 At
issue was the right to a jury trial in a derivative shareholder lawsuit. 8 In
discussing the scope of the Seventh Amendment, the Court stated that among
other factors, "the practical abilities and limitations of juries" must be
considered.186 Arguably, this would favor the lack of jury involvement in
complex matters, such as cases dealing with substantive patent law, and in
particular, obviousness determinations. Unfortunately, the Court has not
revisited this limitation in detail since deciding that case.
Since Ross was decided almost forty years ago, the number of patents
granted per year in the United States has more than doubled. 87 Collectively,
over this forty year span, there have been almost four million patents issued.' 81
This is roughly the same number of patents granted in the previous 180 years. 89
With many more inventions being patented every year, it is much harder to
keep up with technology today than even forty years ago when Ross was
decided. Interpreting these numbers in the context of the Court's note in Ross
only strengthens the argument that the obviousness determination should be
outside of the realm of the jury.
In determining the scope of the Seventh Amendment, it is also helpful to
inquire into the Framers' intent regarding complex cases such as those involving
patents. In 1791 when the Seventh Amendment was ratified, one may assume
that the Framers intended juries to render verdicts in patent actions, especially
181 Patrick Devlin, jury Trial of Complex Cases: Engfish Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment,
80 COLUM. L. REV. 43, 64 (1980).
182 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
183 Id. at 350.
M 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
185 Id
186 Id. at 538, n.10.
187 U.S. Patent Activity: Calendar Years 1790 to the Present, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offic
es/ac/ido/oeip/taf/hcounts.htrn (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
s88 See id (listing number of patent applications and patents granted since 1790).
189 See id. See also Issue Years and Patent Numbers, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/se
arch/issuy ear.jsp (last visited Oct. 5, 2010) (indicating the starting sequential patent number for
each year since 1836).
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when inventions were mainly mechanical. But the scope of patents is vastly
different in today's age. New patents involve disciplines which were
nonexistent in the eighteenth century, such as computer engineering,
biochemistry, and pharmacology.
It was only in 1953 when the double-helix model of DNA was created.190
Had the framers known about the possibility of patents relating to a
complicated DNA structure, would they still have written the Seventh
Amendment in a way that ensures a jury trial in these cases? Likely no, simply
because this would probably be out of the realm of knowledge of jurors.
Advanced degrees are required to comprehend the inner workings of these
fields, many of which did not even exist at the time of the Seventh Amendment.
It would not make much sense to entitle the jury to a power so broad when
they might not even comprehend the subject matter of the lawsuit.
In engaging in an obviousness analysis, not only does one need to
understand the invention itself, he must also be able to determine what one of
ordinary skill in the art knows. This is a more difficult question because it
requires knowledge in the field beyond the invention itself. The difficulty gets
amplified as the material gets more and more complex. These questions may
not have been big problems that required intricate analyses in 1791 when our
fields of inventions were relatively limited. The circumstances have changed as
explained above, yet the scope of the jury trial right has not reflected those
changes.
There is a further inconsistency when a plaintiff sues for damages instead of
simply seeking an injunction. Under present rules, if a plaintiff sues for an
injunction and both the plaintiff and defendant decide to forgo any claims for
damages, the case is a purely equitable action, and there is no right to a jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment. 9 1  In cases such as these, obviousness
determinations are within the sole discretion of the trial judge.
However, if the plaintiff seeks damages in his complaint, or the defendant
asserts damages in a counterclaim, then the right to a jury trial attaches.192 The
underlying issue of obviousness will often be required to determine patent
validity. This same issue, however, would be determined by a jury, rather than a
judge in a case in which damages have been claimed. The mere fact that
damages are sought in a case should not dictate the process in which the same
determination is to be made.
A strong argument can also be made that the Seventh Amendment does not
apply to questions involving the obviousness of a patent because patents are
public rights.'93 Judge Nies, former Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, believes
190 DNA History, http://library.thinkquest.org/20830/Textbook/HistoryofDNAResearch.htm
(last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
191 See Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 257 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
192 See Kennedy v. Lakso Co., 414 F.2d 1249, 1252 (3d Cir. 1969).
193 See In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 981 (Fed. Cit. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting).
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that since patents are public rights granted by Congress under their Article I
power, the determination of the validity of these public rights rests within
agencies such as the USPTO and the International Trade Commission.194 The
Supreme Court has held the right to a jury trial does not attach to actions
involving public rights.195 Therefore, under this understanding, questions on
the validity of a patent, including the patent's obviousness, would not invoke a
jury trial right. Judge Nies further asserts that "[a] litigant cannot have a
constitutional right and not have a constitutional right on the same issue."196
No right to jury trial exists with obviousness determinations before the
USPTO, so it is contradictory that the right attaches to this exact same issue in
a court.
The Fifth Amendment states that "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ."197 If the jury cannot
understand complex facts at trial, then due process may be violated because of a
lack "of fair and reasonable assessment of the evidence and a fair and
reasonable application of the relevant legal rules." 9 8 This not only clashes with
the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, but also Congress's power to
"promote the sciences."' 99 With technology becoming more sophisticated as
the days pass, the strong weight given to the Seventh Amendment in this
conflict must be reevaluated. The increasing importance of companies' reliance
on their patent portfolio provides a strong argument that attaining due process
of law is more desirable than a competing right to a jury trial on the issue of
obviousness.
2. Unformity. Other large countries differ in their handling of patent cases
when it comes to juries.200 These other countries, unlike the United States, do
not try patent cases before juries. 201 Whatever their reasons may be for the lack
of jury trials in this context, uniformity is still an important goal in patent cases.
Having two different standards on validity, particularly obviousness, might pose
an extra burden on companies expanding their patent portfolio internationally
or those already involved in lawsuits. Companies' behavior may change
depending on whether a judge or a jury will be deciding validity questions such
as obviousness.
Although there are certainly differences among different countries' legal
systems, this sort of double standard certainly does not help. If the United
194 Id. at 982-83.
195 Id. at 983.
196 Id.
197 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
198 Miller, supra note 178, at 23.
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
200 See discussion supra Part II.H.
201 Id.
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States adopted the same approach as these other countries, there would be one
less hurdle in attaining uniformity across the globe.
In a landmark obviousness case such as KMR, the Supreme Court did not
mention juries at all in the opinion. Rather, the court only referred to "courts"
and "examiners" when indicating what these parties should be doing as fact
finders. 202 The Court in KSR also mentioned that uniformity and definiteness
are goals in an obviousness analysis. 203 These goals are hardly achieved when
the complexity of the subject matter leads to erroneous jury findings. Nor are
these goals advanced when jury trials are awarded in certain situations but not
others, such as when an administrative agency makes the determination as
opposed to a court of law, or when a complaint or answer is drafted in such a
way as to dictate when the Seventh Amendment will be applicable. Finally, in
the international realm, following the procedure of other countries would bring
the United States one step closer to achieving global uniformity in patent
litigation.
E. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM: ADVISORY VERDICTS
Despite the argument that the Seventh Amendment should not apply to
patent cases, an elimination of the jury in patent litigation altogether may not be
desirable. Juries may still be able to provide some helpful insight into whether
an invention is obvious even though they may not be well suited to render a
binding verdict on the ultimate determination.
Also, because of the millions of existing and presently valid patents, a
sudden and drastic change, such as a complete removal of the right to a jury
verdict on this issue in patent litigation, could be detrimental. The elimination
of juries could, at least initially, lead to a sense of unpredictability since judges
would be deciding matters that juries would have otherwise decided. Until
litigants can understand how judges will analyze issues differently than a jury
might have, this uncertainty will remain. As more cases are resolved through
the courts, predictability should increase. However, there is no telling how long
this may take.
For these reasons, this Note proposes that juries remain in patent cases but
render opinions on certain matters, particularly obviousness, in a solely advisory
capacity. As under Rule 39(c),204 the advisory jury would aid the judge by
making non-binding findings of fact pursuant to the Graham inquiries, and
rendering an opinion on whether they believe the invention is obvious. The
judge would then perform an independent analysis on the issue, incorporating
the jury's advisory findings as he deems fit.
202 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
203 Id. at 415.
ffi FE-D. R. Civ. P. 39(c).
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1. Benefits. A litigant's right to an advisory jury on obviousness would
effectively act as a midpoint between one's Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial and no right at all. By allowing litigants a right to an advisory jury at this
midpoint, the impact of a sudden change in procedure can be decreased.
Although non-binding, the jury's findings may still be influential on the judge's
ultimate obviousness determination. Since obviousness determinations can turn
on common sense principles, 205 having an additional body composed of twelve
members would decrease the chance that something is missed. However,
where the analysis is overwhelmingly complex, a judge would be required to
perform his own analysis separate from a jury's, thus minimizing the chance of
a verdict based on erroneous analysis.
With a traditional jury, the jury findings are practically unreviewable because
of the "black box" effect. This problem would no longer be present if the jury
functioned in an advisory capacity. The judge's analysis on the multiple Graham
obviousness inquiries would likely be more explicit than a jury's, which would
be beneficial for predictability since litigants would have a better idea of what to
expect in court on this issue. If a judge erroneously comprehends the facts
surrounding the analysis, the problem is more likely to be corrected on appeal,
since the standard of review would be different.
One district judge realized the benefits of using an advisory jury on the
question of validity. 206 Although unsuccessful on appeal, 207 the fact that a well-
qualified federal judge decided to treat the jury's verdict as advisory in this
context shows the importance and reasonableness of this proposed reform.
2. Other Areas of Patent Law. In other areas of patent law, advisory juries
have been used without any problem. In Kemin Foods LC v. Pigmentos Vegetables
Del Centro S.A. De C V,208 the Federal Circuit acknowledged the district court's
treatment of the jury's findings as advisory on certain issues of inequitable
conduct.209 Although issues of inequitable conduct do not require a trial by
jury,210 the court's decision to use an advisory jury here illustrates that there are
advantages in using a jury in this capacity in at least some areas of patent law.
In a more recent case, the Federal Circuit explicitly acknowledged the
availability of advisory verdicts under Rule 39(c) on the issue of ensnarement in
patent infringement cases.211 Ensnarement is a defense that "bars a patentee
from asserting a scope of equivalency that would encompass . . . the prior
art." 212 The court also made clear that "ensnarement is a question of law for
205 KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.
206 Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
207 Id.
208 464 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
209 Id. at 1345.
210 See Agfa Corp. v. Creo Prods. Inc., 451 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
211 Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofarnor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
212 Id. at 1322.
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the court, not the jury, to decide" even though the legal determination requires
"the resolution of factual issues." 213 The Supreme Court in KSR similarly made
it clear that obviousness, like ensnarement, is a legal determination. 214
Obviousness, like ensnarement, also rests on a number of factual inquiries. 215 If
advisory verdicts are to be used for resolutions of ensnarement, then the
determination of similar obviousness issues should entail the use of advisory
verdicts as well.
3. Within Congress's Power. Moreover, this proposal for advisory juries is
likely within the scope of Congress's powers. The Court has stated that while
Congress cannot take away one's right to a trial on issues of common law,
issues involving public rights can be taken away from the courts.216
Obviousness determinations of patents, which are arguably public rights, should
therefore be within Congress's power to take away from the courts. This is
already present in our current system, with the USPTO making determinations
of patent validity and obviousness.217  Since Congress has the power to
eliminate this issue from the courts altogether, they certainly have the power to
leave the issue with the judiciary with certain limitations, such as by allowing the
use of an advisory jury to aid in these determinations. Although an advisory
verdict is not a perfect solution, it is one step closer to mitigating the problems
and difficulties in obviousness findings.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the vast amount of time and money put into procuring patents,
litigation involving infringement of these patents requires a very careful analysis.
Obviousness, one of the more difficult ways to invalidate a patent, is especially
deserving of a precise and thorough analysis. Questions have been raised in the
past regarding the procedure through which this determination is to be made.
Some courts view this to be within the power of the judge, while others allow
juries to resolve the issue.
With technology increasing in complexity as time goes on, the subject matter
of patents is becoming more difficult to comprehend and analyze. There are
problems with allowing the jury to have the final say on the fact intensive
determination of obviousness because of this inherent complexity. A jury could
render a verdict based on a misunderstanding of the technology that would
effectively be shielded from appellate review.
The Supreme Court hints in KSR that judges, rather than juries, should be
making this legal determination. Consistent with the Court's opinion and the
213 Id. at 1324.
214 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007).
215 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
216 Den v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1856).
217 See In r Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 982 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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problems with juries in this context, our system should not recognize a Seventh
Amendment right to a jury verdict on this issue. Instead, there should be a jury
sitting in an advisory capacity present to aid the judge in the finding. This
change would not be inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and would
allow a reduction of the known problems regarding juries in patent trials.
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